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Abstract1 
 
Over the last decades, a constant feature of the relations between the European 
Union (EU) and the countries in its neighbourhood has been the export of European 
law. Achieved through bilateral or multilateral agreements, the export of law has led 
to the ‘juridification’ of external policy. The energy sector is in the vanguard of this 
development. European energy law has been made applicable to third countries 
through the European Economic Area (EEA) and, most important for the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Energy Community. Bilateral agreements of 
relevance for energy include the (draft) Association Agreement with Ukraine which 
was rejected in November 2013 and came on the agenda again following a 
revolution in the country. Geopolitics has played and continues to play an eminent 
role in this respect. What does that mean for the export of European law to 
neighbouring countries? This paper argues that the export of European (energy) law 
does not only remain possible but is preferable to purely diplomatic relations 
between the EU and its neighbours if certain conditions are fulfilled. Based on the 
experience in the EEA and the Energy Community, multilateral integration 
agreements can be successful if they offer a well-designed institutional and 
procedural architecture based on mutual commitments, extend the benefits of the 
internal market to the participating third countries and create ‘win-win’ situations in 
satisfying also the participating third countries' vital interests in return for undergoing 
the hardship of economic reforms.  
 
  
                                                          
1 This paper is based on a ‘High-Level Lecture on the ENP in a Comparative Perspective’, 
delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges on 5 March 2014. The author has written this 
paper in a personal capacity. Nothing in this paper can be attributed to the Energy 
Community Secretariat.  
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Prologue: Ukraine’s rejection of the Association Agreement and its 
consequences 
The recent events in Ukraine, undoubtedly the European Union’s most prominent 
neighbour today, earned it the title of the “birthplace of Strategic Europe”.2 In any 
event, these events illustrate both the importance and the limits of the current 
European Neighbourhood Policy. The turbulent sequence of events unfolding since 
November 2013 began with protests and violence on Maidan square, which 
triggered the fall of the Yanukovich regime and in turn the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia. At the time of writing, the conflict continues in Eastern Ukraine. From the 
beginning, the Euro-Maidan revolution was embedded in a broader geopolitical 
context, namely Ukraine’s orientation between the two powers on its eastern and 
western borders, Russia and the European Union. Ukraine has close historical, cultural 
and economic ties with both. ‘Neighbourhood policy’ for Ukraine has a slightly 
different meaning than it has for most of the EU Member States. The revolution in 
Ukraine was not only one against a corrupt government it was also about how to (re-
)balance the relations with its two neighbours. The Association Agreement with the 
European Union, put up for signature at the Vilnius Summit in November 2013, was 
symbolic for this re-balancing. As far as the history of revolutions goes, the rejection of 
an international free trade agreement is a rather unusual trigger. While few people 
had probably read the agreement then, it symbolized something different for 
everybody involved. 
For the people on Maidan square, the draft Association Agreement with the EU, 
rejected by Ukraine’s ancien régime, epitomized what the preamble explicitly 
referred to as Ukraine’s European choice. Little did the drafters know how the 
manifestations of the “strong public support in Ukraine for the country’s European 
choice” would change the course of history.3  
For the EU institutions, the Association Agreement with Ukraine4 is the most ambitious 
deal ever negotiated in terms of economic integration.5 It was meant to become a 
                                                          
2 Jan Techau, Ukraine, the Birthplace of Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 18 March 2014, 
http://www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=55002, retrieved 20 February 2014. 
3 Quote taken from a recital in an earlier version of the draft Association Agreement. 
4 The text of the Association Agreement (AA) is available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/ 
assoagreement/assoagreement-2013_en.htm, retrieved 20 February 2014.  
5 Karel de Gucht, EU-Ukraine trade negotiations: a pathway to prosperity, Speech delivered 
at the INTA Committee Workshop, Brussels, 20 October 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-11-692_en.htm?locale=en. The Association Agreement is to replace the 
present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which dates back to 1998. 
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historic milestone in the evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership. The conclusion of bilateral agreements with neighbouring 
countries is the essence of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Association 
Agreement with Ukraine envisages a “political association” in the form of a political 
dialogue6 and complemented by cooperation in the areas of justice, freedom and 
security.7 The political provisions of the Agreement were eventually signed by the EU, 
its Member States and Ukraine on 21 March 2014. The Agreement’s most substantial 
part, however, not yet signed at the time of writing, is trade-related. The draft for a 
so-called “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” is largely modeled on the 
WTO Agreement. It provides for the elimination of customs duties for certain goods8 
and requires Ukraine to gradually approximate its legislation to EU standards and 
law9 in an “exceptionally broad”10 range of areas such as public procurement,11 
transparency, environment, protection of intellectual property, etc. 12  In terms of 
enforcement it envisages an elaborate arbitration procedure.13 
We can only speculate about what the Association Agreement offered to Ukraine 
meant from the perspective of the Russian government. A basic lesson learned from 
November 2013, however, is that third countries with strategic interests in the Union’s 
neighbours will scrutinize any offer made by the European Union and may react with 
a counter-proposal, among other things. Russia also champions a Eurasian Economic 
Community (the framework for the so-called Customs Union), which borrowed some 
key features and institutions from the EU itself, and membership in which was offered 
to Ukraine. As alternative options exist, the European Neighbourhood Policy is no 
longer a bilateral affair.14 The neighbours of our neighbours matter. After Ukraine, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy turns into a comparison of systems. In times of 
globalization this is quite evident anyway. Possible alternative options are not limited 
                                                          
6 Title II AA. 
7 Title III AA. 
8 Article 29 AA. The European Union unilaterally abolished customs duties on 21 March 2014. 
9 Article 474 AA. 
10 Karel de Gucht, op.cit. 
11 Articles 148 et seq AA. 
12 Articles 157-252 AA. 
13 Which the Agreement describes in great details, Articles 306 et seq. AA. 
14 Sensitivity about the interdependence of the European Neighbourhood Policy was maybe 
not always high in the past. In a document entitled “Myths about the EU-Ukrainian Association 
Agreement – Setting the facts straight” (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/152074.htm, 
retrieved 20 February 2014), one could read: “Of course, if Russia decided to retaliate 
[economically], there would be negative short-term consequences for Ukraine’s exports, but 
this would be a policy choice made in Moscow and cannot be attributed to the 
Agreement.”  
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to an association with Russia or its Customs Union. They may include policy choices 
such as maintaining the status quo under a paternalistic regime, selling-out to foreign 
investors with a strategic agenda or even succumbing to the allure of religious 
fanaticism, as could be observed in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’. We may have to 
accept further that in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, Europe has lost its former 
allure of a ‘promised land’, for which a neighbouring country will happily and without 
hesitation pay the entrance fee in the form of taking over EU rules. 
The Yanukovich government, finally, must have compared the draft Association 
Agreement with the proposals made by Moscow. The Russian offer – as far as it is 
known – included a purchase of Ukrainian bonds of $ 15 bn as well as a discount 
which brought down the gas price to $ 268.5 per 1,000 m3.15 That offer was accepted 
and the European Union would have been out of the game if the Ukrainian people 
had not interfered with the Union’s flag in their hands. Obviously, the Union cannot 
always count on revolutions inspired by a romantic affection for Europe in its 
handling of foreign affairs. Other examples in Eastern Partnership countries – Belarus, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan – demonstrate that. Usually the government and its 
parliamentarian majority will decide whether an agreement offered by the European 
Union matches the country’s interest. The Yanukovich government had evidently 
answered that question in the negative. 
While the Association Agreement would have failed if it had not been for the 
protesters on Maidan, Ukraine is and has been a party to another agreement based 
on EU rules throughout all crises. In 2011 Ukraine had acceded to the Treaty 
establishing the Energy Community. The country even accepted preconditions by 
adopting a gas law following European rules, and has been implementing the acquis 
communautaire at least to some degree ever since. To be sure, President 
Yanukovich himself several times announced a withdrawal from the Treaty and it 
cannot be excluded that Ukraine’s membership in the Energy Community was at 
stake in the negotiations with Moscow. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s membership 
                                                          
15 As of 1 April 2014, the discount was withdrawn. Moreover, the price rebate granted in 2010 
in return for the extension of the lease on the Black Sea Fleet’s naval base on Crimea was 
subsequently cancelled. Naftogaz of Ukraine now pays 485 $ per 1,000 bcm. The price for 
Belarus, a member of the Customs Union, is 165 $ per 1,000 bcm. 
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remained continuity.16 The new government made implementation of the Energy 
Community rules an explicit priority.17 On the European side, Ukraine’s membership in 
the Energy Community receives unfettered support from Member States and 
institutions alike. In a resolution on the situation in Ukraine in early February 2014, for 
instance, the European Parliament considered that “further efforts should be made 
to include Ukraine in the EU’s energy market via the Energy Community”.18   
The commitments made in the framework of the Energy Community in some respects 
go even further than the proposed Association Agreement. The Energy Community is 
based on the export of the entire European internal market governance model (for 
energy), which includes fundamental principles such as unbundling, the right to third-
party access and market opening. The Energy Community explicitly aims to integrate 
Ukraine’s energy sector in Europe’s internal energy market. That this is relevant for 
Ukraine is beyond doubt. The energy sector is of crucial importance for the country’s 
economy, which heavily depends on Russian gas supply and transit fees. It is in the 
energy sector that the question of integrating with Russia or the European Union 
matters most for Ukraine. It is an interesting question why Ukraine kept its allegiance 
with the Energy Community – and thus EU energy rules – while it withdrew from the 
Association Agreement in exchange for, inter alia, a rebate in the gas price. It 
appears as if certain aspects of membership in the Energy Community are attractive 
enough to third countries to continue sector reform the sector. The experience made 
with the Energy Community may thus be relevant for answering the question of how 
agreements concluded with the Union’s neighbours can be based on EU rules and 
still be fair and attractive to them, even under difficult geopolitical circumstances, as 
in Ukraine’s case.  
  
                                                          
16 On 7 February 2014, at the height of the protests on Maidan, Ukraine and the Energy 
Community Secretariat even signed a memorandum establishing an “Implementation 
Partnership”, an instrument meant to speed up the harmonization of the country’s legislation 
with the acquis communautaire. See http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ 
ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details?p_new_id=8601, retrieved 20 February 2014. 
17  http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details? 
p_new_id=8782, retrieved 20 February 2014. On the EU side, the European Parliament 
demands “further efforts […] to include Ukraine in the EU’s energy market via the Energy 
Community”. See European Parliament Resolution No 19 of 6 February 2014 on the situation in 
Ukraine (2014/2547(RSP)).  
18 Resolution adopted in Plenary on 6 February 2014 in Strasbourg. 
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The export of EU law to neighbouring countries 
The European Union over the last decades engaged in a strategy of exporting its 
rules to its neighbours.19 Law export, or “legal transplants”, has a long history inside 
and outside Europe,20 including the reception of Roman law or the propagation of 
the Code Napoleon. While countries in transition have always looked for inspiration in 
more advanced jurisdictions, it is also in the interest of the ‘exporter’ to have the 
normative framework in other countries modeled on its own rules. The export of 
European law to neighbouring countries can be and actually is organized in different 
ways. The focus of this paper is on law export through the conclusion of international 
agreements. In this respect, we will distinguish between bilateral and multilateral 
export agreements.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy as well as its related organizations, the Eastern 
Partnership or the Union for the Mediterranean, is multilateral in nature but does not 
directly export legally binding rules. These arrangements rather provide a policy 
framework for the conclusion of bilateral agreements aimed at the approximation 
with EU rules.21 The bilateral path to European law export has become increasingly 
cumbersome recently. Ukraine is only the most spectacular case in point. With Russia, 
the negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement have been in a deadlock for a 
long time. But we do not even have to look that far to the East: the bilateral relations 
between the European Union and Switzerland, based on a bundle of bilateral 
agreements, had turned complicated even before the recent referendum on mass-
immigration. Both sides find it difficult to agree on the scope of substantive EU rules to 
be taken over by Switzerland (and the terms for an energy agreement are under 
negotiation already for several years). And it seems to be all but impossible to agree 
on the institutional arrangements necessary to move from abstract commitments to 
real implementation.    
Multilateral agreements are better suited to avoid these pitfalls. Not only can they be 
a vehicle to export European law to more than one country at the same time. Once 
negotiated and signed, they also establish a model which third countries find easier 
                                                          
19 Stephan Renner, “The Energy Community of Southeast Europe: A neo-functionalist project 
of regional integration”, EIoP, vol. 13, 2009, p. 4. 
20 See, for an overview, Michele Graziadei, “Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal 
Knowledge”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 10, 2009, pp. 693-714. 
21 See, for instance, Sandra Lavenex, “Concentric circles of flexible ‘EUropean’ integration: A 
typology of EU external governance relations”, Comparative European Politics, vol. 9, 2011, 
pp. 383 ff. 
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to join. Most importantly, they establish a more complex balance of power and open 
possibilities for alliances, whereas a bilateral partnership is almost inevitably 
dominated by the more potent partner. Multilateral agreements also justify the 
creation of independent institutions which seems almost impossible to achieve in a 
bilateral relationship. The advantages of multilateral agreements over bilateral ones 
are thus not only of a quantitative but also of a qualitative nature.  
A comprehensive multilateral legal framework for the European Neighbourhood 
Policy does not exist. There seems to be no follow-up on the idea to create a 
“Neighbourhood Economic Community”.22 However, there are two existing models 
for multilateral integration agreements between the European Union and 
neighbouring countries. One engages in comprehensive and the other one in 
sectoral internal market export. They are the EEA for three EFTA States, and the 
Energy Community covering – besides a number of accession countries in South 
Eastern Europe – the ENP States Moldova and Ukraine, and soon Georgia. 
The EEA Agreement 
Already at the outset of the ENP in 2003, the European Commission proclaimed that 
the policy’s long-term goal was “to move towards an arrangement whereby the 
Union’s relations with the neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close 
political and economic links currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area.”23  
The EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994. It was conceived and negotiated in 
the early 1990s upon an initiative by Jacques Delors. Its main objective is to unite the 
markets of the EU and of the participating EFTA States (today: Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway, but at the time still a more considerable part of Western Europe) in one 
common internal market. The Agreement grants EU and EFTA States reciprocal 
access to their markets. In order to create the necessary level-playing field in the 
EFTA countries, they commit to take over the bulk of the acquis communautaire.24 As 
concerns institutions, the Agreement creates joint bodies of which the EEA Joint 
Committee is of greatest practical importance. It incorporates EU law into the EEA on 
                                                          
22 See Sieglinde Gstöhl, “A Neighbourhood Economic Copmmunity – finalité économique for 
the ENP?”, EU Diplomacy Papers, 3/2008, Bruges, College of Europe. 
23  Commission Communication “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COM(2003) 104 final. 
24 With certain exceptions, namely the Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies; Customs 
Union; Common Trade Policy; Common Foreign and Security Policy; Justice and Home Affairs 
and the Monetary Union. The EFTA country Switzerland has not joined the EEA Agreement. 
Dirk Buschle 
10 
an ongoing basis. Decisions are taken by its members – the representatives of the 
EFTA States as well as the European External Action Service – by consensus. Besides, 
the EFTA/EEA States also established administrative and judicial institutions within their 
pillar of the EEA Agreement, namely the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA 
Court.25 They replicate the respective authorities in the EU pillar, the Commission and 
the Court of Justice. They watch over implementation and interpret the terms of EEA 
law, that is, exported EU law. To avoid deviations, the tie binding both pillars together 
is the homogeneity principle. This principle can be considered the ‘holy grail’ of the 
EEA Agreement. It guides legislative decisions, that is, the incorporation of new EU 
legislation by the EEA Joint Committee. But its greatest relevance is for judicial 
decision-making at the EFTA Court, with the EU Court of Justice’s jurisprudence as the 
point of reference.26 
The EEA works smoothly. As much as to a well-designed institutional architecture this 
is owed to the fact that the ‘legal and cultural DNA’ of the participating EFTA States 
is very similar to that of the EU-15. Iceland and Norway are Nordic countries closely 
tied to EU Member States Denmark and Sweden, whereas Liechtenstein’s political 
and legal traditions are shared between Austria and Switzerland. As homogeneous 
this renders the EEA in structural terms, it is difficult to conceive its enlargement by 
countries acceding from outside this Northern and Western circles, in other words 
European Neighbourhood Policy partners. 
The Energy Community 
The Energy Community, by contrast, is geographically much closer to, and partly 
overlaps with the European Neighbourhood Policy area. It currently covers five 
Contracting Parties from former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania, and two former 
republics of the Soviet Union, Moldova and Ukraine. Like the EEA Agreement, the 
Energy Community is a vehicle to export EU rules to participating third countries. As 
the name suggests, the Energy Community is sectoral in nature27 even though it 
includes certain horizontal provisions such as environment, competition and state 
aid.  
                                                          
25 The idea to establish a joint EEA Court proved legally impossible following the EU Court of 
Justice’s Opinion 1/91. 
26 Due to sovereignty reasons, judicial homogeneity is subject to a sophisticated distinction 
between the following by the EFTA Court of the EU Court of Justice’s pre-agreement case law 
and the mere “taking due account” of its post-agreement case law. 
27 Covering the electricity, gas and oil sectors. 
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Instead of the two pillars of the EEA, the Energy Community is structured in three 
layers. Besides the export of EU law to Contracting Parties under the first layer,28 the 
Treaty establishes the possibility for setting genuine regional rules (including for 
neighbouring EU Member States) as well as for the energy markets of the EU-28 plus 
the eight Contracting Parties. These two layers29 are missing in the EEA Agreement. In 
this respect, the Energy Community deliberately deviates from the concept of two 
pillars tied together by strict homogeneity. It gives the Energy Community a potential 
for the development of a legal framework for pan-European energy policy which 
goes beyond the simple mechanism of exporting law. In practice, however, this 
potential has rarely been used. The European Union put internal safeguards in place 
which are meant to ensure that Energy Community law does not bypass or overtake 
EU law.30 This can be considered as a unilateral insistence on homogeneity and on 
letting the EU institutions take center stage. In the Energy Community Treaty, this is 
ensured through giving the Commission the exclusive right to propose new EU acquis 
for incorporation, as well as veto rights for the Union in decision-making under the 
more sensitive second and third layers. 
Institutionally, the model chosen by the Energy Community Treaty is one of only joint, 
not parallel institutions. That is why the homogeneity principle, even though 
enshrined in the Treaty,31 features less prominently than in the EEA Agreement. Unlike 
in the EEA, the joint institutions are either independent of the Community’s members 
(namely the Secretariat) or take decisions in accordance with the supranational 
majority principle (the Ministerial Council, the Permanent High Level Group and the 
Regulatory Board). In the decision-making process, all parties represented dispose of 
one vote without any weighing according to size. That means that any Contracting 
Party in principle has the same voting power as the entire European Union.  
The weakest feature of the Treaty is enforcement: instead of establishing a 
surveillance authority with competences comparable to the Commission or the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority, the only instrument available to enforce compliance is an 
infringement action procedure initiated and carried out by the Secretariat. Instead 
of leading to a judicial body for decision, the ultimate decision-maker is the 
                                                          
28 Title II of the Treaty. 
29 Titles III and IV of the Energy Community Treaty. 
30 Decision 500/2006/EC. 
31 Article 94 of the Energy Community Treaty. 
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Ministerial Council, a non-independent and non-expert institution. Deterring sanctions 
are also missing.32   
The Energy Community was originally conceived somewhat more technically than 
the EEA, namely to prepare the countries in post-war South Eastern Europe for EU 
accession, and to push for the reforms necessary to attract investments in the energy 
sector. Over the last years, however, the Energy Community has evolved into the 
European Union’s principal strategic instrument to organize its external energy 
relations. Ukraine’s accession in 2011 was a milestone in this respect. Georgia, 
another strategically important country, is currently negotiating for accession.33 The 
Energy Community has gained an unexpected vitality and attractiveness to ENP 
countries. To further increase the Energy Community’s attractiveness to third 
countries and to rectify some of the institutional shortcomings such as weak 
enforcement, a High Level Reflection Group under the chairmanship of Jerzy Buzek is 
currently developing proposals for reform of the Energy Community. It aims to make 
the Energy Community fit for its new policy role in which it found itself almost by 
accident, and not necessarily well-prepared. 
Which European model to be exported? 
Both the EEA and the Energy Community, despite their differences in character and 
design, have proved to be successful in bringing countries in the neighbourhood (not 
limited to ENP countries in the technical sense) under EU rules. The multilateral 
approach corresponds best to the EU’s own history and experience. In the case of 
the Energy Community, for instance, the European Coal and Steel Community was 
an explicit point of reference.34 The successes of the EEA and the Energy Community 
imply that the EU can play its strengths and experiences best by not only creating 
but also participating, as a member, in a multilateral agreement which is modeled 
on its own governance scheme to a more or lesser extent. Multilateral integration in 
this sense is a true European value and an asset in the relations with third countries. 
To be a good basis for a fair and attractive offer it should contain the following 
elements: 
  
                                                          
32 Articles 90-93 of the Energy Community Treaty. 
33 Others, however, such as Turkey, have never joined for political reasons, even though the 
mutual benefit would be high. 
34 Renner, op.cit., p. 8. 
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Integrating in a joint internal market 
The European Union’s historic achievement is the integration of economies and its 
beneficial impact on peace and stability. Integration of markets is at antipodes with 
diplomatic deal-making and the use of energy as a political weapon. The main tool 
to promote integration in Europe is the internal market, the European Union’s flagship 
instrument to this day. The internal market is the sum of its parts and even more. 
Consequently, export of European law should not be limited to the export of 
individual pieces of legislation or norms. What is required is the “externalization of the 
internal market”.35 The export of the internal market in its entirety requires sharing it. 
This may work also in one sector, as the example of the Energy Community shows, 
and even if the sector is of high geopolitical and social sensitivity.36 
In energy, integration of markets has very concrete benefits for its participants. In the 
Contracting Parties to the Energy Community, membership has brought about clear 
and tangible integration benefits. This is particularly true for Ukraine. In the electricity 
sector, the country benefits from the free movement of goods which helps its 
companies’ export activities. In the gas sector, the diversification of gas supplies is 
made possible by reverse flows of gas through the pipelines entering the EU in 
Hungary and Poland. The introduction of that kind of gas-to-gas competition has 
effectively decreased Gazprom’s leverage over the country in the past, and is likely 
to play an important role again in the preparations for next winter’s security of 
supply. Overcoming the remaining obstacles to reverse flows using the (larger) 
capacities at the Ukrainian-Slovakian border 37  may require applying the Energy 
Community rules (sector-specific energy law and competition law) vigorously to the 
contracts concluded between Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine. In any event, the 
abstract concept of market integration based on the rule of law materializes in very 
concrete benefits in this case. 
                                                          
35 Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Political Dimensions of an Externalization of the EU’s Internal Market”, EU 
Diplomacy Papers, 3/2007, Bruges, College of Europe, p. 4. 
36 For sure, sectoral internal market export can be made more potent if certain horizontal 
elements which proved to be very effective in the history of European integration, such as 
competition and state aid enforcement or public procurement law are included. 
37 For details on the options as well as the remaining obstacles, see Georg Zachmann/Dmytro 
Naumenko, “Evaluating the options to diversify gas supply in Ukraine”, German Advisory 
Group Policy Paper Series, PP/01/2014, February 2014. On 28 April 2014, a Memorandum of 
Understanding enabling reverse flows from Slovakia to Ukraine was eventually signed. The 
relevance of Ukraine’s membership in the Energy Community for this success was highlighted 
in thy Commission’s press release,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-487_en.htm  
Dirk Buschle 
14 
Legally binding commitments and their implementation 
Europe in the 1950s chose to integrate national economies through the 
harmonization of legal rules. As regards external policy, the focus on rules and 
market governance rather than following more political approaches has been 
criticized.38 Experience shows, however, that binding commitments matter. Looser or 
softer cooperation arrangements tend to come to a point where giving the 
respective partner country an agenda for political and economic reform, supported 
by capacity-building, knowledge-transfer or technical assistance, is not enough to 
overcome certain domestic obstacles which frequently take the form of norms.  
An agreement based on binding legal rules can be expected to be more 
transparent, neutral and fair than a political one. Based on the expectation of 
implementation in the domestic legal orders, legal commitments also serve as clear 
targets aimed at changing domestic legal frameworks epitomizing structural 
rigidities. The implementation success can be monitored, which in turn is a 
precondition for any corrective action. Measuring compliance or non-compliance of 
a country such as Ukraine in the past proved also very helpful to build up pressure 
from civil society, investors or external donors, often a precondition for real change 
to happen inside a country.  
Such indirect enforcement is obviously not sufficient in itself to turn abstract 
commitments into reforms. To be credible, enforcement of rules in an integration 
agreement requires judicial decision-making replacing diplomatic dispute 
resolution.39 This is also called for by the standards of the European Convention on 
Human Rights with regard to access to justice. 40  The EEA Agreement is clearly 
superior to the Energy Community Treaty in this respect. 
Moreover, an element of public enforcement is indispensible when following the 
European integration model. Relying on enforcement based solely on private, 
subjective interest – which in the area of international energy relations usually takes 
the form of arbitration – is indispensible, especially in certain countries in the 
                                                          
38 See Arianna Checchi/Arno Behrens/Christian Egenhofer, “Long-Term Energy Security Risks 
for Europe”, CEPS Working Document, no. 309, Brussels, January 2009, p. 40. 
39  For more details Dirk Buschle, “The Enforcement of Energy Law in Wider Europe”, in 
Buschle/Hirsbrunner/Kaddous (eds.), European Energy Law, Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 
2011, pp. 303-342. 
40 See the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in case Bosphorus vs Ireland of 30 
June 2000. 
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European neighbourhood. Opening a path to arbitration in the energy sectors is the 
main benefit of the Energy Charter Treaty. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area follows the same approach.41  
But arbitration has two major shortcomings: First, without a public authority 
systematizing and prioritizing cases, enforcement takes place only randomly. To give 
an example, in the Energy Community a disproportionate number of the complaints 
raised by private investors relates to the lack of cost-reflectivity of energy tariffs. While 
this is an important issue indeed, investors do normally not complain about many 
other important issues, such as energy efficiency or the lack of market opening. 
Without enforcement initiated by an independent public authority, non-
implementation of the majority of commitments made by Contracting Parties would 
remain unsanctioned. 
Second, an arbitration procedure is costly and lengthy. It may be affordable to big 
international investors, but small and medium enterprises, domestic companies or 
consumers will often shy the costs and rather choose to stay outside risky markets if 
arbitration is the only mitigating factor they can rely upon. It is those players, 
however, which can and should benefit most from market integration. Arbitration 
thus cannot replace a judicial institution granting access to justice for citizens and 
business, as a true public service, and not only to those who can afford it. 
The importance of institutions 
European integration history further teaches us that Monnet’s concept of 
perpetuating and further developing the level of integration by creating institutions is 
a key success factor. If the ENP idea is indeed “sharing everything but institutions”42 
the concept is flawed. Institutions can reinforce and balance the interests of the 
members of the respective organization (Ministerial Councils or Joint Committees). 
More importantly, they can defend the interest of the organization itself, private 
persons and economic operators against the state. In the latter case, institutions 
need to be truly independent. In an agreement extending the internal market 
                                                          
41 The arbitration procedure envisaged under the provisions of the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area create a special regime for energy matters, namely an explicit fast-track 
procedure for energy supply disruptions, Articles 307(8), 308(4), 309 and 310(3) of the draft AA, 
and special retaliation measures in the form of suspension of rights arising from the Free Trade 
Area, Article 314 of the draft AA. 
42 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Po9licy as the Key to Stability”, Speech02/619 
given in Brussels on 5 December 2002. 
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governance and rules, independence of institutions is not necessarily a threat to the 
ownership of the EU institutions over their own rules. Applying an intelligent 
homogeneity principle as in the EEA helps overcoming such concerns. When 
designing an institutional architecture for an integration agreement, the EU model 
based on elements such as equal treatment, rule of law, independence and 
majority-ruling is and should be the standard. Extending it together with the relevant 
rules on substance is a matter of fairness. The fact that the Energy Community, for 
instance, allows third countries to discuss and vote on equal terms with the European 
Union partly explains its attractiveness.  
Satisfying the interests of law-importing countries  
According to this author’s view and experience, integration through expanding the 
internal market, effective implementation of binding commitments and functioning 
institutions are the three basic elements for a good design of European law export. 
As much as the design matters, however, it will not suffice to ensure the success of 
this export in the long run. Implementing European rules, if taken seriously, constitutes 
a major effort for any rule-importing country. As the experience in the Energy 
Community, and in particular the recent events in Ukrainian show, implementation 
needs to satisfy genuine interests not only at the time of signature but on an ongoing 
basis. This is often forgotten in an organization as stable and perpetual as the EU 
itself.43 The European Union’s basic interest in exporting its own rules can probably be 
taken for granted. 44  The discussions inside the Union rather revolve around the 
question of which – political, economic or financial – price we are ready to pay. But 
for third countries, changing the governance in one or more economic sectors by 
aligning it with the European model, requires a strong motivation. In the following, a 
few recurring motives will be discussed. 
Reform for the sake of increasing efficiency 
“Our offer is easier”, the Economist recently quoted a European Minister. “Our 
condition is that Ukraine should start fixing its economy. Russia’s condition is that 
Ukraine should become a vassal.”45 Fixing the economy by applying European rules 
                                                          
43  Recently, however, Member States such as the United Kingdom openly discuss their 
interests in adhering to the European Union. 
44 Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Political Dimensions of an Externalization of the EU’s Internal Market”, EU 
Diplomacy Papers 3/2007, p. 6. 
45 The Economist, “Charlemagne – Keep the door open”, 8 February 2014. 
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is more easily said than done, especially in the energy sector with so many vested 
interests in maintaining the status quo. Yet taking on European rules as the best 
available software for market reforms and integration remains the ideal motive for 
joining the internal market. Obviously, the European reform ‘software’ may have its 
bugs as well.46 But it is state of the art for organizing basic reforms of inefficiently run 
sectors. Countries may, for instance, realize that their power utilities are on the verge 
of bankruptcy because they must sell at artificially low prices to their customers. Or, 
that huge gains in terms of sustainability and security of supply can be made by 
saving energy in a smart way. If a country looks for a template for good governance, 
it has an interest in joining the Energy Community or the EEA. In the given political 
situations in many neighbouring countries relying on this motive might sound naïve. 
Yet the rationale of increasing efficiency of the energy sector can play an important 
role in a bundle of motives, and can even be dominant. The energy systems of the 
EEA member Iceland or the future Energy Community member Georgia are both not 
interconnected to any neighbouring country under EU rule. Despite their 
geographical isolation, both countries apply the acquis communautaire out of a 
belief in the healthiness of reforms and find the EU’s rules on unbundling, third-party 
access and independent regulatory authorities helpful.  
Countries which are or can be interconnected among themselves and Member 
States have an additional incentive in applying European rules as an instrument and 
driver for the integration of (regional) markets. According to economic theory, the 
integration of markets can increase allocative efficiency by enabling economies of 
scale and widening consumer choice. This is confirmed in practice by investors 
having little appetite to enter small markets. In the energy sector, the benefits to be 
reaped are particularly high because the cross-border allocation of factors such as 
different fuel mixes and production costs can be organized more efficiently than 
within the confinements of one small country. In practice, however, false dreams of 
energy autarchy often prevent countries from effectively coupling their markets on a 
regional level. Yet market integration remains interesting not only for the once 
integrated countries of South Eastern Europe but could also be an argument for the 
electricity systems in Northern Africa or the Caspian region in the future. Switzerland, 
                                                          
46 Taking the internal energy market as an example, a discussion has started about the 
appropriate balance between the sustainability goal and various forms of state intervention. 
See European Commission, Communication from the European Commission “Delivering the 
internal electricity market and making the most of public intervention”, Brussels, 5 November 
2013, C(2013) 7243 final. 
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a country with a high degree of technical integration with the EU market, could 
particularly profit also from legal integration under a governance scheme such as 
the one of the Energy Community.  
The experience in the current Contracting Parties to the Energy Community shows, 
however, that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to the export of EU rules may have to 
be reconsidered at least in part, in order to enhance their capacity to effectively 
reform markets which differ from those in Western Europe as regards their historical, 
geographical and social conditions. Insisting on the adoption of EU law in a uniform 
manner admittedly ensures homogeneity within the enlarged internal market 
created between the EU and third countries. But homogeneity should not turn into a 
straightjacket. Certain elements of the energy acquis communautaire such as retail 
market opening, or supporting renewable energies in the same way certain Western 
countries have done in the past, may, and have already, put Eastern and South 
Eastern countries under stress. The issue is complex as, on the other hand, the 
practice of setting energy prices at a too low level for social reasons lies at the 
bottom of serious inefficiencies of the energy systems. Balancing liberalization and 
social stability is not a simple task. This challenge calls neither for less nor for different 
rules as the EU’s rules, but for rules adapted to the specific needs of the law-
importing countries in a smarter way. Law export requires a certain degree of 
flexibility and creativity in shaping EU rules. Flexibility in this context has several 
dimensions. It may require ad hoc adaptations of the acquis for individual 
countries,47 or a ‘variable geometry’ among the participating third countries based 
on a differentiated set of rules with a common minimum, or even the adoption of sui 
generis rules for the pan-European internal market. This was envisaged but never 
practiced under Titles III and IV of the Energy Community Treaty. The need for flexible 
integration is by no means an argument against integration as such. In order to be 
successful and attractive, however, European law must be exported creatively. A 
simple “copy-paste” approach does not suffice for successful transplantation; the 
European law exported risks to remain debris in the receiving legal order.   
                                                          
47 The EEA envisages the possibility of derogations. In the Energy Community, Article 24 of the 
Treaty stipulates: “For the implementation of this Title, the Energy Community shall adopt 
Measures adapting the acquis communautaire described in this Title, taking into account 
both the institutional framework of this Treaty and the specific situation of each of the 
Contracting Parties.” The extension of the Republic of Moldova’s deadline to unbundle its gas 
transmission system operator under the Third Package by the Ministerial Council in 2012 is the 
most relevant example for flexibility to date. 
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Access to the EU internal market 
The EU internal market is an attractive target for investments as well as for goods, 
services and labour. Free trade and integration agreements pursue the objective of 
enabling mutual market access. The success of the EEA Agreement, for instance, 
depends on the EFTA countries’ satisfaction with access to the internal market. The 
merits of market access are most direct for countries with strong export or investment 
companies. This is not necessarily the case in many ENP or enlargement countries.48 
Moreover, energy is a special case as cross-border trade is still not as much 
developed as it is in other sectors. And in the case of natural resources, the allure of 
access to the internal market may not be enough to offset the (perceived) threat to 
sovereignty through applying rules of transparency and non-discrimination.  
That does not mean, however, that market access could not be or become a strong 
motive for acceding to an integration agreement such as the Energy Community. 
Market access is beneficial also for consumers. The advantages of gas reverse flows 
for Ukraine were already mentioned.49 In electricity, Ukraine exports to the internal 
market from the so-called Burshtyn island at a profit. Pressure from the electricity 
business was one of the motives for the country joining the Energy Community. In the 
South Eastern Europe, so far only Turkey’s investors have shown a real appetite for 
accessing the regional and the Union’s markets. However, the country is currently 
prevented from joining the Energy Community for political reasons. 
Security and solidarity 
Integration does not only concern and benefit markets but also national security. This 
is most obvious in the strategically relevant energy sectors. The preamble to the 
Energy Community Treaty expresses the Parties’ determination “to establish among 
the Parties an integrated market in natural gas and electricity, based on common 
interest and solidarity”. 50  Integration and solidarity with the other parties to an 
integration agreement may help cushioning energy systems in crises, thus reducing 
                                                          
48 The interest in market access may relate to access to the labour market and lifting visa 
requirements. The Association Agreement with Ukraine does not waive visa requirements. An 
amended Visa Facilitation Agreement of July 2012 addresses the issue. 
49 Supra, III. 1. 
50  This aspect was emphasized by Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger, “An energy 
community for the future”, Speech given in the European Parliament on 20 March 2014, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-238_en.htm?locale=en, retrieved 20 
February 2014. 
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vulnerability and improving resilience. In energy, security of supply was one of the 
main motives for establishing an internal market in the first place. And crisis is no 
stranger to energy. The two gas disruptions in 2006 and 2009 which traumatized 
Europe both involved Ukraine. For the EU, integrating Ukraine in and through the 
Energy Community was a major achievement. For Ukraine, however, things are more 
complex, as it is also integrated closely with the gas system of a third country, Russia. 
Yet even under the Yanukovich regime Ukraine has explicitly appealed to European 
solidarity against actions of its Eastern neighbour. President Yanukovich had 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Energy Community on account of the latter’s 
purported failure to prevent the South Stream project, a serious threat to the viability 
of Ukraine’s gas transport system.51 In fact, solidarity against South Stream was one of 
the main motives for Ukraine to join the Energy Community back in 2011. At the same 
time, other Contracting Parties have expressed a strong interest in realizing South 
Stream. What looks like a ‘catch 22’ is actually a misunderstanding: Yanukovich’s 
understanding of solidarity was a purely diplomatic one whereas the concept of 
solidarity in both the European Union and in the Energy Community is inseparable 
from the concept of the rule of law. The Secretariat in fact had already reminded 
the Contracting Parties which concluded intergovernmental agreements with Russia 
on South Stream of their incompatibility with European energy law. Solidarity in this 
sense means treating every country and every project equal by the yardstick of 
compliance with a country’s legal commitments. 
Accession to the European Union 
Article 49 TEU grants any European state the right to apply to become a member of 
the EU. The hope to join the European Union as a full member and to speed up that 
process makes accession candidates accept the rule of European law already 
before the date of accession. Preparing countries in South Eastern Europe for 
accession was one of the founding motives of the Energy Community. These 
countries are ready to take upon them the hardship of reforms as EU membership is 
their main and maybe only strategic policy option. However, this motive has eroded 
to some extent even in the Balkans. EU enlargement fatigue, the slowing-down of the 
accession process and the fading of hope that EU accession will rapidly improve the 
                                                          
51  http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details? 
p_new_id=6821, retrieved 20 February 2014. 
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economic situation in these countries creates frustrations and resistance against 
carrying on with reforms.52 
The Eastern Partnership countries such as Ukraine have not been offered EU 
membership in concrete terms. The Association Agreement “is not about EU 
membership for Ukraine”.53 The Ukrainian population and political elite have always 
been very conscious about the lack of a clear membership perspective. After the 
rejection of the Association Agreement, there are more voices in Europe who believe 
that the EU should change course. Commissioner Füle stated recently that “only a 
promise of future accession can change the region”.54 And on 10 February 2014 the 
Council acknowledged “that this [the Association] agreement does not constitute 
the final goal in EU-Ukraine cooperation”. This was explicitly linked to Article 49 TFEU 
by the recent congress of the European People’s Party.55 That is currently not the 
mainstream view within the European Union, let alone its formal position. However, 
the question of when and under which conditions to consider EU membership of ENP 
countries in more concrete terms is on the table and will require an answer. If EU 
accession turns out not to be possible, a well-designed multilateral integration 
agreement matching the needs and interests of the countries in question can be a 
valid second-best option. The case of the EEA/EFTA countries, having rejected EU 
membership on their own motion, shows that such alternatives can work well. A 
sectoral agreement such as the Energy Community, however, cannot replace EU 
accession and will have to satisfy additional interests of its members. 
Financial support and attracting investment   
Besides preparing for accession, the second key motive for founding an Energy 
Community back in 2005 was the attraction of investment and (private) investors, 
both through domestic reforms and integration of small markets. The interest in 
attracting investments is as strong as ever in the ENP countries. With the economic 
                                                          
52 Andrea Despot/Dušan Reljić/Günter Seufert, “Ten Years of Solitude - Turkey and the Western 
Balkans Require Practical Integration Measures to Bridge the Hiatus in the European Union 
Enlargement Process”, SWP Comments, 2012/C 16, May 2012. 
53 European Commission, “Myths about the EU-Ukrainian Association Agreement – Setting the 
facts straight”, op.cit., p. 4. The preamble recognizes, however, that “Ukraine as a European 
country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the 
European Union”. 
54  http://euobserver.com/foreign/123055, retrieved 20 February 2014. Others are more 
skeptical, for instance, Commissioner Olli Rehn in an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of 7 April 2014.  
55 Emergency Resolution on Ukraine adopted by the EPP Congress, Dublin, 6-7 March 2014. 
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crisis still not over and implementation not advancing as fast as the commitments 
suggest, private investment did and does not come in the desired magnitude. 
Remedies are not obvious. In any event, seriously applying the rule of law, as a 
‘meta-principle’ of the acquis communautaire including, inter alia, functional 
institutions such as courts and regulators, is the sine qua non for investment 
attraction. This may have not yet been fully understood and deserves better 
promotion. Still, it will not be sufficient. In the context of the Energy Community reform 
process, additional mechanisms to support the raising of the necessary funds for 
energy investments and mitigating risk are currently being discussed.  
Public investment by international donor organizations such as the EBRD, EIB, World 
Bank or the European Union is not directly affected by the crisis. It usually comes with 
conditions which often make reference to full implementation of the acquis 
communautaire. Conditionality is never popular. In Ukraine, the former administration 
was frustrated when it realized that the EU and Western donors would indeed not 
invest in rehabilitating the gas system without the country being serious about 
reforms. Conditionality, however, is a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it links the 
‘carrot’ of financial help with implementation of the rules. It is thus of equally big 
importance as the ‘stick’, enforcement. On the other hand, conditionality can be 
dangerous where countries consider having other options. The conditions Russia 
made in November 2013 seemed to be easier acceptable to Ukraine’s ancien 
régime. We may conclude that conditioning financial support is indispensable for 
reforms to materialize but the conditions must be carefully chosen. In this respect, 
focusing on structural reforms may be more promising than the demand for drastic 
rises in energy prices. 
The question of financial support is still in flux. While the German Foreign Minister 
stated that “the EU cannot enter into a competition of billions compared to what 
Russia can put at Ukraine’s disposal”,56 the course of the events seems to change the 
attitude in the EU and international donors with regard to the short-term needs of a 
country on the verge of bankruptcy. The EU’s recent assistance package consists of 
€ 11 billion, of which the majority is loans from EBRD and EIB.57 In the long term, 
however, investment must come from private sources, for which, in turn, reform and 
integration must path the way. 
                                                          
56 German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, http://euobserver.com/foreign/123078, retrieved 20 
February 2014. 
57 For details see http://euukrainecoop.com/2014/04/14/rasbash-3/. 
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Conclusions 
Over the last decades, the EU has been silently expanding58 through the export of its 
internal market laws. This process has run smoothly as far as multilateral agreements 
are concerned, especially with the EEA and the Energy Community. The latter, which 
in only a few years has developed into the principal policy instrument for organizing 
the EU’s foreign energy relations, shows that the export of European law to ENP 
countries has a future. Further ‘juridification’ of external relations will also benefit the 
European Neighbourhood Policy.  
Expansion through bilateral agreements, on the other hand, seems to have hit rock-
bottom in EU relations as diverse as Russia and Switzerland. But it was the violent case 
of Ukraine that turned the spotlight on this expansion process and the unresolved 
questions underlying it. Given that neighborhood policy is not the EU’s exclusive 
backyard anymore, and that neighbouring countries do have other options, the 
content and circumstances of the European offer matter.  
The European Union should, firstly, build on and share its own experience in 
integrating the continent under one common market based on common rules and 
institutions. Where accession is not an (immediate) option, the Union should not be 
afraid of creating communities governed by fair rules and effective procedures. To 
be credible, the Union should commit to such communities also legally by joining as 
an equal partner. This commitment has been one of the success factors of the 
Energy Community. 
Secondly, an attractive offer must create true win-win situations, which requires that 
the partner country has a vital and continuous interest in implementing the acquis 
communautaire. In doing so, we have to make business, civil societies and 
consumers our allies and help them also satisfying their interests, such as increased 
transparency and effective judicial protection. The failure to include civil society in 
the discussions of the Association Agreement was one element that triggered the 
Euro-Maidan revolution and everything that followed. Values such as transparency, 
reliability and the rule of law are Europe’s ‘unique selling point’ in the competition for 
the most attractive economic and political governance model.  
                                                          
58 Alvin Pool, “The Silent Enlargement”, EU Reporter, Spring 2009, pp. 24-25.  
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Thirdly, it must be recalled that in order to be successful, the ‘transplantation’ of 
European law requires certain foundations in terms of legal and cultural traditions, 
including the independence and effectiveness of institutions, which we cannot take 
for granted in third countries other than the EFTA States. This fundamental challenge 
is often overlooked. As Alan Riley recently observed, addressing it is essential in order 
to make European law export a success.59    
Fourthly, exporting European rules through integration agreements should not follow 
a simplistic mechanism of ‘one-size-fits-all’ but should leave room for flexibility. 
Flexibility in integration agreements has two main dimensions: flexibility in adapting 
the EU rules taken over by the participating third countries, and flexibility in designing 
genuine rules and institutions for all parties, including the European Union. In the best 
case, this creates laboratories also for the further development of European policy 
and legislation. Flexibility and homogeneity must be well-balanced. The European 
Union, its rules and institutions should remain the point of reference also in an 
expanded internal market. This requires “creative homogeneity” among the 
institutions involved.60 
Finally, the European neighbourhood has become larger. In times of globalization, it 
cannot be determined solely on the basis of geography any more. Under the 
condition that third countries share our core values, extending the internal market 
through integration agreements means continuing the European story and should 
not be ruled out for individual countries or regions. The Energy Community proves 
that integration can take place in one sector, even if as many vested interests as in 
energy are involved. Integration has positive knock-on effects on stability and 
peace. Under the condition that overly controversial issues such as natural resource 
governance are excluded (which in energy basically leaves the electricity sector or 
cross-cutting policies such as energy efficiency), even countries which are currently 
perceived as difficult neighbours may in the future become partners in a multilateral 
integration agreement.61  
                                                          
59  Alan Riley, “Deploying the Energy Incentive: Reinforcing EU Integration in South-East 
Europe”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 268, Brussels, 8 July 2013. 
60 A term coined by the former judge at the European Court of Justice Christiaan Timmermans 
(ed.), Creative Homogeneity, Liber Amicorum in honour of Sven Norberg, Brussels 2006, pp. 
471 ff. 
61 The Foreign Minister of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, recently discussed the idea of integrating 
Russia through a Free Trade Area, see Der Standard of 7 April 2014. 
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Summing up, the export of European internal market law and governance 
constitutes still the best available instrument to achieve market reforms in partner 
countries and integration with the European Union. It needs to match the interests of 
the partner countries which in turn calls for the European Union to define its own 
strategic interests, the core values and principles we are insisting on as well as a 
discussion on what we are ready to offer in terms of, for instance, accession or 
financial support. This will require a thorough and open internal debate. The recent 
events in Ukraine have made it very clear that the export of European rules is not a 
one-way street. As the recent proposal by the Polish Prime Minister to create an 
Energy Union shows,62 these events are even capable of triggering a renaissance of 
visionary integration concepts within the EU-28, something hard to imagine only a 
few months ago. The Energy Community, arguably the EU’s most seminal vehicle for 
the export of EU law today, already establishes an energy union avant la lettre.63 It is 
a true pan-European union in which the EU and its Member States are not alone any 
longer.      
  
                                                          
62 Donald Tusk, “A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehood”, Financial Times of 21 
April 2014. 
63  In particular if the potential of Title IV of the Treaty was fully tapped and/or further 
developed. 
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